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FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
I. Introduction
The right of privacy has been called a necessary ingredient of an
ordered and free society.' Although not explicitly mentioned in the
United States Constitution, a privacy interest is considered an un-
derlying principle of the guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights.'
The courts and legislatures have established that a claim based
on the invasion of one's right to privacy must arise under one of the
four categories of the tort of invasion of privacy:3 1) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another;4 2) appropriation of a per-
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2. Soldiers may not be lodged in a private person's house without his consent. U.S.
CONST. amend. III. Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited. Id. amend. IV. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). State action must operate within certain restric-
tions. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Most
important, rights not expressly enumerated in the Constitution and its amendments are re-
served to the people. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 n.12 (2d Cir.
1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Pro-
tection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964); Yankwich,
The Right of Privacy; Its Development, Scope and Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429
(1952).
The right of privacy has been called a "penumbra" from the Bill of Rights. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484V(1965). Recognition of the right of privacy is not recent.
Ninety years ago, Warren and Brandeis wrote that the right of privacy is an evolving concept
which finds its roots in the most basic common law protections of person and property.
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter cited as
Warren & Brandeis]. Throughout the common law, the individual has been granted the
qualified right to determine, regardless of the medium or form of expression used, "to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others" by third
parties. Id. at 198. Although absence of malice or truth of the matter are no defenses to the
alleged violation of this right, once the subject consents to disclosure of the facts, his right is
extinguished. Id. at 218.
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V.
SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1057-89 (6th ed. 1976); See generally Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326
(1966); Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right of Privacy?", 4 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1959).
4. See Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P.2d 993 (1973) (where a wife, in attempting
to prove that her husband was a homosexual, paid an orderly of a hospital, where her hus-
band's alleged lover was undergoing an operation, to get samples of the lover's hair to be
used in comparing it with that found in her husband's bed).
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son's name or likeness;5 3) public disclosure of private facts Which
is highly offensive to a reasonable person not of legitimate concern
to the public;' and 4) portrayal of an individual in a false light in
the public eye.7 So as not to leave a wrong remediless, it has been
suggested that a new privacy action be recognized to protect an
individual's privacy rights from the technological advances of the
computer age.8
Computers have a virtually limitless capacity to store and re-
trieve information.' Presently, computers are readily available,
compact and more cheaply able to store information than destroy
it;'° this has led to the expansion of governmental information
practices." Moreover, the information collected will frequently be
5. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (where an
insurance company used Pavesich's picture together with a quote attributed to him to adver-
tise insurance); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (where a
bakery used the photograph of a vaudeville actress to advertise bread without her consent).
6. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (where a television station
disclosed the name of the 17 year old victim of a rape. Although the court found that there
was no tort since the name was a matter of public record, the opinion contains a good analy-
sis of the requirements for the tort of public disclosure of private facts).
7. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (where a reporter inac-
curately portrayed the family of an accident victim as living in abject poverty).
8. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEO.
L.J. 509, 532 (1969).
The problem presented by the diminution of the right of privacy as a result of "modern
enterprise and invention" was itself anticipated almost a century ago. Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 2, at 196. The power to control the flow of technologically transmitted informa-
tion about his individuality comes from the individual's right of privacy. J.M. ROSENBERG,
THE DEATH OF PIVACY 143-61 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG].
9. One of the more advanced storage systems of Interkiational Business Machines, Inc.
(IBM), the IBM 3850 Mass Storage System (MSS), provides for on-line storage of up to 472
billion bytes (characters) of data. This data is contained on cartridges measuring 2 inches in
diameter by 4 inches in length. Each magnetic tape cartridge has a storage capacity of 50.4
million characters. IBM 3850 Mass Storage System (MSS) Introduction and Preinstallation
Planning 2, 13 (GA. 32-0038-0, File number S370-07 (Ist ed. Nov. 1978)).
10. A chip that has been developed by International Business Machines (IBM) has the
calculating capabilities of the room size computer of twenty-five years ago yet is only one-
quarter inch square. The Computer Society, TIME, Feb. 20, 1978, at 44. Developments such
as this chip have led scientists to predict that the microelectronic revolution will "ease,
enhance and simplify life in ways undreamed of even by the utopians. At home or office,
routine chores will be performed with astonishing efficiency and speed." Id. at 46. The IBM
chip has been mass produced to such an extent that computer systems can sell for as little
as eight hundred dollars each and prices, it is promised, will go even lower. Paper will be-
come obsolete and everything will be recorded through the processes of these chips. Id. at 46-
47.
11. The power to collect information is inferred to be adjunct to the effective exercise of
powers enumerated in the Constitution. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160-75
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inaccurate and potentially detrimental to the individual con-
cerned." Our legal system must strike a balance between the needs
of a complex society for services and information and the possible
dangers posed to the individual's recognized right of privacy by the
availability of information maintained by the federal government. 3
The difficulty inherent in this balancing process is demonstrated
by the numerous extensive studies undertaken concerning this
problem. 4 As a result of these studies, several bills are currently
before both the House and Senate that attempt to resolve fairly the
dilemmas posed. 5 Such bills include: Privacy of Research Records
Act; 6 Federal Information and Privacy Board Act of 1978;'" Omni-
bus Right to Privacy Act of 1979; 1" and Privacy Protection Amend-
ments of 1979."°
Part II of this Comment will examine the failure of the proposal
for a single data bank of federal information due to its inability to
(1927). See also Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L.
REv. 971, 1277-78 (1975). These powers include the power: (1) to enumerate the population,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; (2) to impeach, id. cl. 5; (3) to judge election returns, id. cl. 1;
(4) to discipline and expel members of Congress, id. cl. 2; and (5) to legislate, id. § 1. The
power to investigate, which is a necessary component of the power to legislate, has been
limited to such investigation that pertains to the asserted legislative purpose, Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), and which is expected to result in "valid legislations on
the subject to which the inquiry referred." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 195 (1880).
12. In addition, such a widespread recording system seems to run counter to our criminal
justice system, i.e., rehabilitation is specious if the records will follow the subject always and
mar any good faith efforts that he may attempt to make good. See DeWeese, Reforming Our
"Record Prisons": A Proposal for the Federal Regulation of Crime Data Banks, 6 RUTGERS
CAMDEN L.J. 26 (1974-75). See also Turner v. Reed, 22 Or. App. 177, 538 P.2d 373 (1975).
13. J. Rehnquist, in the first sentence of the Court's opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281 (1979), delineated the problem thus: "The expanding range of federal regula-
tory activity and growth in the Government sector of the economy have increased federal
agencies' demand for information about the activities of private individuals and corpora-
tions. These developments have paralleled a related concern about secrecy in Government
and abuse of power." Id. at 285-86.
14. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
FEDERAL DATA BANKS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter
cited as SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY]; D. LINOWES, SURVEY RESEARCH LABORATORY OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, A RESEARCH SURVEY OF PRIVACY AND BIG BUSINESS (July 27,
1979) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as LINOWES SURVEY];
U.S. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY, NATIONAL INFORMATION POLICY
(1976).
15. See note 14 supra.
16. S. 867, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 8671.
17. H.R. 350, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 3501.
18. H.R. 2465, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2465].
19. H.R. 5559, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 55591.
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safeguard privacy. Part III will synopsize the study of the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights on the deficiencies in government
data collection as it affects individual privacy rights. Part IV will
examine the present privacy statutory scheme as established by the
Freedom of Information Act 0 and the Privacy Act of 1974.1 Part V
will consider the already mentioned bills pending in Congress
which purport to fill loopholes in the present law while balancing
considerations of privacy and the public's need for information."
II. The National Data Center as a Prior Legislative
Alternative
In the mid-1960's, Congress considered a proposal for acquiring
and centralizing the government's data on planning and research.2 3
The main purpose of this proposal was to create a better, inte-
grated information network for use by government, industry, and
research communities. An agency to be called the National Data
Center (NDC) was introduced as the central data bank. Statistical
data obtained by a variety of federal agencies in the exercise of
their statutory mandates was to be collected by the NDC. Pres-
ently, that information is maintained by separate agencies.
The NDC was to accumulate the data that is presently dispersed
throughout a large number of different government agency files and
maintain a current inventory of all data collected by federal agen-
cies. By eliminating duplicative efforts of information collection
and statistical analysis, the NDC would increase government effi-
ciency. A public advisory committee consisting of representatives
from various segments of the public, as well as interested govern-
ment officials, would be formed. The committee's function would
be to disclose publicly the bodies of data in the center, the persons
using this data and their purposes. The committee also would be a
clearinghouse for any prospective central data bank entries."'
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
21. Id. § 552(a) (1974).
22. See pt. V infra.
23. The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee
on Invasion of Privacy of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ruggles Report].
24. Invasions of Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Dunn Critique].
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Mechanical and electronic safeguards would be developed to fore-
stall unauthorized access.25 Files would be managed in such a way
as to make it prohibitively expensive to obtain information about
individuals by invading the Data Center. Stiff penalties would be
levied for violation of any provision.
Proponents argued that it would be easier both to monitor disclo-
sures from a centralized source and institute an improved system
of safeguards." In addition, because sensitive information collected
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue
Service would not be contained in the NDC, the privacy invasions
would be negligible.
The proposal, however, contained serious deficiencies. First, the
information retained in the bank may be inaccurate or applied im-
properly.? There was also a potential for mistake in the transfer of
information from agency files to the NDC. Second, it would be dif-
ficult to determine the existence of errors because of the bulk of
information contained in the bank. Such misinformation could ad-
versely affect an individual even though he is unaware of the cause
of the difficulties.18 Assuming the individual knew the cause, there
would be little incentive to undertake a lawsuit because the propo-
sal did not provide for damages .2  Third, although proponents of
25. See generally Ruggles Report, supra note 23.
26. See generally, Dunn Critique, supra note 24. For a contrary view, see pt. III infra.
(discussion of Subcommittee Study).
27. Symposium: Computers, Data Banks, and Individual Privacy, 53 MINN. L. REv. 211,
221-22 (1969) (transcript of speech given by John de J. Pemberton, Jr., Executive Director,
ACLU, entitled On the Dangers, Legal Aspects and Remedies). For example, similar names
may be confused and the records of one party applied to those of another improperly. A, not
knowing why, is unable to get a mortgage. He finally discovers that information about B, a
bad credit risk, having defaulted on previous payments, was mistakenly inserted into A's
dossier due to the affinity of their names.
28. A survey conducted by the American Federal of Information Processing Societies
(AFIPS) and Time magazine, administered in the spring of 1971, indicates that only 15
percent of the people responding to the survey claimed that they had some knowledge of how
a computer system works. When asked about problems they had had because of a computer,
the highest percentage of respondents, 34 percent, mentioned problems with billing. More
than 90 percent of those surveyed believed that computers were being used for credit card
billing, preparing bank statements and "compiling information files on U.S. citizens." NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE PROJECT ON COMPUTER DATABANKS OF THE COMPUTER SCI-
ENCE & ENGINEERING BOARD, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 481-85 (1972).
29. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). Here, the respondents claimed to re-
present a class whose rights were infringed by the existence of the Army's surveillance and
data gathering system of lawful political activities. The Court held that failure on the part of
the respondents to show concrete injury indicated the lack of a justiciable controversy and
would bar the granting of relief.
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the NDC claimed that only statistical records would be contained
in the bank, the line between statistical and intelligence informa-
tion is bound to become difficult to ascertain. In addition, trained
intelligence personnel could derive potentially damaging data even
from a statistical system. 0 Fifth, a computer breakdown in a cen-
tral data bank would have potentially devastating consequences in-
cluding an extremely damaging impact on the economy.3 Finally,
unauthorized access could result in a serious violation of privacy
rights; indeed, the very nature of computer technology contributes
to the uncertain status of safeguards against such access. People
with remote terminals will potentially be able to misuse the infor-
mation. Moreover, computer technology moves at such a rapid
pace that safety considerations cannot be based on our present
knowledge.3" Making access difficult or expensive will not alleviate
this problem. The art of electronic surveillance will only become
more efficient, and once safeguards are penetrated, a violation of
privacy interests is more serious because all the information is in
one place.33 Not to be overlooked is the significant damage govern-
ment employees can inflict by negligence.34
30. ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 35. It has also been alleged that such an all-encompass-
ing system would encourage federal officials to engage in questionable surveillance tactics.
The example used by the author was an optical scanner that reads mail and is hooked up to
the NDC. Such a scanner could define the subject as one who associates with criminals
simply because he sends a Christmas card once a year to a person of questionable character.
Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Mr. Dennis Huaman of the General Electric Co., who is an internal security special-
ist with that company, feels that the most dangerous infringements are committed by per-
sons knowledgeable in the computer field. "[Mlost of a company's data is actually taken
when it is transmitted to other sites or transferred to hard copy .... " Scannell, Security
Expert Sees No Way to Stop D.P. Crime, 13 Computerworld No. 50, at 7-8 (weekly ed.
1979).
33. For example, a systems programmer at a reasonable level of experience who gains
access to a computer storage dump (a listing of the data which was in the Central Processing
Unit at the time of a program error), will be able to decode various vital pieces of informa-
tion about the programs and possibly systems security. Landon, Software Putting Program-
mers Out of Business, 13 Computerworld No. 50, at 22 (weekly ed. 1979).
34. Extreme care must be taken in selecting programming personnel. Currently, a bill is
pending in Congress which would, by amending title 18 of the United States Code, make it a
crime to use for fraudulent or other illegal purposes, a computer which is either owned or
operated by the United States. This restriction would also apply to certain financial institu-
tions and entities which affect interstate commerce. Federal Computer Systems Protection
Act of 1979, S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 240]. See also Ham-
lin v. Kelly, 433 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Il. 1977), where the court held that because preserva-
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The concept of a central data bank Was first examined by the
Committee on the Preservation of Economic Data. This commit-
tee had been created by the Social Science Research Council's upon
the recommendation of the American Economic Association.37 After
four years of study, the Committee submitted a report to the Coun-
cil38 which was referred for review to the Bureau of the Budget. The
report recommended that: 1) the Bureau of the Budget, as the
agency in charge of the Federal Statistical Program, take immedi-
ate steps to establish a Federal Data Center; 2) the Office of Statis-
tical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget place an increased em-
phasis on th systematized preservation, in an accessible form, of
important data prepared by those agencies engaged in statistical
collection; and 3) the Social Science Research Council convene rep-
resentatives from research institutions and universities to assist in
developing an organization which could provide a clearinghouse for
data requests made by individual scholars and federal agencies.3"
The Council report" maintained that any potential threat to pri-
vacy was outweighed by the public good served by centralized
collection."
This report caused much controversy. In 1968, a House Commit-
tee Report set forth its official response to the NDC concept.4
2 It
tion of the individual's right is so overriding, inadequacy of staff or funds cannot be used as
a defense by the agency.
35. SUBCOMMITrEE STUDY, supra note 14, at XVI.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ruggles Report, supra note 23. The evaluation and study was conducted by Edgar S.
Dunn of Resources for the Future, Inc.
39. Id., app. 1, at 195.
40. Id.
41. Dunn Critique, supra note 24. The Task Force on the Storage of and Access to Gov-
ernment Statistics, in reaching the same conclusions as the Ruggles Report and the Dunn
Critique, took as its focal point the organization and functioning of the NDC and recom-
mended that Congress set standards of disclosure, such standards to be enforced by a Direc-
tor of the Federal Statistical System. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON THE STORAGE OF AND AccEss TO GOVERNMENT STATISTICS (1966). Further hearings
were held in an attempt to balance the privacy issue against the efficiency of the computer.
Computer Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). While the
NDC debate continued, the Joint Economic Committee issued a report which confirmed
that current information did not meet the needs of the nation and advocated the NDC pro-
posal. SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STATISTICS OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., THE COORDINATION
AND INTEGRATION OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL PROGRAMS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
42. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL DATA BANK
1979-801
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concluded that the serious problems regarding the collection, use
and security of personal information in a single information bank
should delay implementation of the NDC until the technical feasi-
bility of assuring privacy was fully explored." The report argued
that future plans include an independent supervisory commission
to regulate not only the extent and operations of the NDC, but also
the procedure by which information would be accessed. 4 As a re-
sult of this report, the NDC concept has not been revived. 5
III. The Study of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights: Federal Data Banks and Privacy
A. Background
The use of computers for collecting data about citizens was ex-
plored by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights" in 1971.11
The Committee began its work amidst the growing debate over the
NDC. The study directly responded to five questions posed by Con-
gress: 1) what personal information should be collected by the fed-
eral government;48 2) what means should be used to obtain it;4" 3)
CONCEPT, H.R. Doc. No. 1842, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. In fact, H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(c), at 57 (Title II: Privacy Act Amendments
of 1979), also rejects the development of a standard of universal personnel identifier, which
entails the assigning of a number to each individual to identify him. This makes it easier to
link together files of personal information which originally may have been obtained for dif-
ferent purposes. Davis, A Technologist's View of Privacy and Security in Automated Infor-
mation Systems, 4 RUT. J. OF COMPUTERS & THE LAW 264, 273 (1974-76). See pt. II infra.
46. The subcommittee, which had been created at the beginning of the eighty-fourth
Congress, has been interested in individual privacy since its inception and among its first
actions were extensive hearings on wire tapping and government secrecy. After Senator Sam
J. Ervin, Jr. became its chairman in 1961, the subcommittee began to concentrate on gov-
ernmental infringement on individual privacy. Widespread studies of compartmentalized
problems conducted by the subcommittee indicated that each was a part of a general
schema of individual privacy juxtaposed against government's accumulation of information.
As the computer became the obvious source of information activity, the subcommittee fo-
cused on an exploration of the privacy issue and mechanization. I SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY,
supra note 14, at XXXIII - XXXIV.
47. Federal Data Banks Computers and the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1 (1971).
48. Id. at XV.
49. Id.
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who should have access to it;10 4) to what extent and under what
conditions should information gathered for one purpose be made
available for another;5 and, 5) what rights do citizens have with
respect to these data banks?"
B. Findings
The Subcommittee mailed surveys to fifty-four government agen-
cies.5 3 Although all of the agencies returned the survey, some left
selected questions unanswered. The agencies polled by the Sub-
committee indicated that they maintain 858 data banks54 of vary-
ing size.55 Over eighty-six percent of the reported data banks are
computerized. 6 The study divides these data banks into three ma-
jor types: 1) administrative, i.e., those established to assist federal
agencies in discharging their responsibilities to administer pro-
grams;57 2) evaluative, i.e., those which collect information used to
make certain status determinations regarding file subjects; 8 and,
3) statistical, i.e., those which collect information about groups of
subjects for management and planning purposes." At least twenty-




53. Id. at XXXVII.
54. The author of the study feels that indications are that the agencies understate the
scope of their personal data banks. Id. at XXXVII. The number of subjects contained in the
data banks is impossible to state precisely; there are at least 1,245,699,494 records on indi-
viduals. Id. at XXXIX.
55. E.g., The Air Force Special Weapons Center maintains a ten record manual security
clearance file; the Department of Commerce Computerized Decennial Census data bank
contains 204,000,000 records. Id.
56. Id. at XLIX, table 1.
57. Roughly sixty-nine percent of the data banks are administrative. Id. at L, table 2.
E.g., the Small Business Administration's Accounting System, which is a data bank file
containing information about the businesses which have applied for an S.B.A. loan: the
name, address, race, type of business, bank used, annual sales, and credit rating. 6 id. at
3191.
58. The personnel security files of the Department of Defense, e.g., which are compiled
for security clearance purposes, contain various identifying data, including: physical descrip-
tions, aliases, mental disorder, drug addiction, foreign travel, identification of foreign rela-
tives and friends, neighborhood checks, sympathies with subversive organizations or any in-
cidents in the individual's life which would involve a question of the individual's loyalty to
his country. 2 id. at 1304.
59. E.g., The Decennial Census Data Bank of the Department of Commerce which com-
piles information across a broad spectrum of individuals as provided in 13 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
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collect derogatory information ("blacklists")." In addition, there
exist numerous files containing potentially damaging information
that are not maintained for the purpose of predicting specific crimi-
nal acts." For example, one file compiled names of persons who
were the subject of allegations which were later found to be
unsubstantiated .62
The extent to which governmental information systems are au-
thorized by explicit Congressional enactment varies from agency to
agency. Eighty-four percent of the agencies surveyed were unable
to cite explicit statutory authority; eighteen percent cited no statu-
tory authority whatsoever. 3 The types of statutory authority which
the agencies have for the collection of information fall into three
categories: 1) express authority, where authorization flows from a
definite statute;" 2) derivative, where authorization is considered
essdntial to or necessarily required by specific programs which
60. The individuals contained in these files have been singled out for special treatment
by federal agencies due to various "bad acts" on their part. 1 id. at XXXIX.
As an example of what these files contain, the "Debarred Bidder's List" is a list of con-
tractors and grantees who are to be excluded from participation in Department of Housing
and Urban Development programs for a period of time commensurate with the seriousness of
the offense or inadequacy of performance. The offenses which lead to inclusion on this list
include conviction of a criminal offense as an incident to attempting to obtain a public or
private contract, violation of contract provisions, willful failure to perform terms of a con-
tract, a record of failure to perform contracts, accepting a contingent fee in violation of the
contractual provision against contingent fees, commission of fraud as an incident to carrying
out or obtaining the contract. There are 802 subjects on this list. 3 id. at 2138-59. The Fed-
eral Communication Commission's blacklist consists of the name, address, date of birth of
individuals, and a code number indicating the reason for their inclusion on the list, which
includes: failure to pay a Commission forfeiture; license revocation; issuance of a bad check
to the Commission; stopping payment on a check to the Commission; as well as information
supplied by the FBI on persons who are allegedly subversive. The purpose of the list is to
evaluate license applicants and grant licenses to only those persons who would serve the
public interest. There are 12,000 subjects on this list. 5 id. at 2914-16.
61. E.g., the Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration's Computerized
Addict Files, which usually contain the name of the addict arrested, and enumerate which
drugs were found in his possession at the time of arrest, the specific offense charged, etc. 4
id. at 2285.
62. The Defense Supply Agency's Security Files and Records, a computerized data bank,
is such a file. 1 id. at XL.
63. One governmental unit unable to cite any statutory authority for keeping an informa-
tion system was the White House. Id. table 3, & XLI.
64. A good example of a statutorily mandated data bank is the Department of Transpor-
tation's National Driver Register. Id. at XLI. The National Driver Register is a central clear-
ing-house on driver licensing and is used to assist each state in locating the records that
problem drivers may have established in other states. Its purpose is to keep irresponsible
drivers off the roads. 4 id. at 2457-91.
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themselves are derived from an express statutory mandate;" and,
3) implied, where authority is not absolutely necessary but thought
to be useful in carrying out a program set up by specific
legislation."
Agencies receive information from three sources: 1) existing
records;67 2) the subjects themselves;" and, 3) third parties."
Twenty-five percent of the agencies claimed reliance on all three
sources.70 A survey conducted at the University of Illinois by the
former Chairman of the United States Privacy Protection Study
Commission7 revealed that private companies routinely disclose
confidential personal data about their employees upon inquiry by a
federal agency. Of the companies surveyed, forty-one percent re-
sponded that they had no policy as to which records were to be
disclosed.72 The nonexistence of a stringent policy as to disclosure
of employee files leaves the person in charge, whether it be an exec-
utive or record clerk, with the discretion to determine what sensi-
tive information a government agent will have access to, regardless
of its relevancy to the agency's function or the particular agent's
authorization. The Privacy Protection Commission has recom-
mended to Congress "[tihat an employer [be required to] articu-
late, communicate, and implement fair information practice poli-
cies which should include . . . limiting external disclosures of
information in records kept on individual employees, former em-
65. Approximately twenty-one percent of the agencies responding claimed this type of
legislative authority. Id. table 3. E.g., National Defense Executive Reserve data bank of the
Department of Commerce which is necessary to implement 5 U.S.C. 301 (1976). Id. at 242.
66. Forty-five percent of agencies surveyed cite this authority. SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY,
supra note 14, table 3. E.g., the Office of Economic Opportunity cites the agency's broad
legislative mandate to "evaluate poverty" as authority for ten of its data banks. Id. at XLI.
67. I.e., data banks which derive their contents from other data banks. Seventy-one per-
cent of the 469 agencies responding to this question stated that they rely on existing data
banks, e.g., the Department of the Army. Id. table 9. ,
68. Sixty-four percent of the agencies responding utilize subject-provided information,
e.g., the Internal Revenue Service; the Decennial Census; Selective Service System. Id. table
9. One necessarily queries whether the individual really is providing this information volun-
tarily since these agencies compel disclosure on pain of criminal penalties.
69. Forty-one percent of the agencies rely on the third party sources. E.g., security clear-
ance and background check files. Id. at XLVIII & table 9.
70. Twenty-five percent of the agencies rely on all three sources. E.g., Department of the
Air Force; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Veterans Administration. Id. ta-
ble 9.
71. LINOWES SURVEY, supra note 14, at 7.
72. Id.
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ployees, and applicants . . .,,7
A large portion of the data banks are kept without the individ-
ual's knowledge. Forty-two percent of the 469 agencies responding
stated that subject individuals are not notified of their inclusion in
a data bank.7 Virtually all of the intelligence files fall into this
category.75 Twenty-seven percent of the agencies responding said
that subjects should realize that data on them is kept by the
agency from their dealings with a particular agency." The Selective
Service Administration explained that because the individual sub-
jects provide it with information, they should infer that it will be
placed in a data bank." Only thirty percent of the agencies ex-
pressly inform subjects that the data they supply will be placed in
a bank..
The damages which may potentially result from a breach of an
individual's privacy rights may be eliminated by granting a subject
the right to review his file. Fifty-three percent of the agencies re-
sponding to a question on this issue stated that subjects are al-
lowed to review their entire files.7 However, because so few individ-
uals are aware of their inclusion in a file, a right of review is, at
best, illusory. Approximately thirty-three percent of the agencies
affirmed that subjects are not allowed to review their own files at
allY1 Other agencies responded that individuals are afforded review
73. Id. at 9.
74. E.g., Department of Justice Internal Security Division; the White House Talent
Bank; the Commerce Department's Executive Reserve. SUBcoMMIrrEE STUDY, supra note 14,
table 4.
75. Id.
76. E.g., The Veterans Administration said that subjects should infer that they are
placed in a data bank from the computerized benefit checks they receive. Id. at XLII &
table 4.
77. 6 id. at 3132. Governmental units frequently use this "consent and waiver" defense,
whereby the subject implicitly consents to disclosure of the information once it is released to
the government. Such a defense was approved in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975), where the United States Supreme Court held that once information is contained
in official records, disclosure thereof is permissible. Id. at 492.
78. The Internal Revenue Service includes a note about the computerized master file on
Income Tax forms. 5 SUBCOMMIrEE STUDY, supra note 14, at 2630. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission notifies by press release. 6 id. at 3088.
79. 1 id. at XLIII. The Marines provide subjects with a printout of their individual file at
least once a year. 2 id. at 1251.
80. 1 id. at XLIII. Such is the case for most of the intelligence data banks. E.g., Depart-
ment of Justice's Organized Crime Information System. 4 id.; Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration Addict Files. Id. at 2198.
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within the ambits of the Freedom of Information Act.8' Fourteen
percent of the agencies stated that they allow subjects to review
only selected data.82 Only the Air National Guard requires person-
nel to review their files once a year."
Although individual subject access is considerably limited, the
information contained in each federal agency data bank is readily
passed on to other federal, state and local agencies pursuant to reg-
ular operating procedures.8' Sixty percent of the agencies grant
other federal agencies some degree of access."5 Twenty-five percent
allow direct access either by routine distribution of data or com-
puter interface. 8 The Internal Revenue Service, for example, which
vows confidentiality, does distribute some information to various
government agencies."7 Law enforcement agencies generally permit
other agencies direct automated access by computer interface.
Nineteen percent grant other agencies access to the files upon re-
quest. 8 Twelve percent allow access according to certain estab-
lished agency procedures." Many allow disclosure to other agencies
as members of the general public under the FOIA.10 Three percent
of the agencies responding consider the file data to be public
information."
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). For a discussion of the Freedom of Information Act, see pt.
I1(A) infra.
82. This is true for most agencies' personnel files. 1 SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 14,
at XLIII.
83. 2 id. at 318.
84. 1 id. at XLIV & table 6.
85. Id. The Defense Supply Agency's Control Index File of security clearances is main-
tained for the benefit of "user agencies." Id. at XLIII.
86. Id. at XLIV. Interface is defined as: "A shared boundary; e.g., the boundary between
two systems, or between a computer and one of its peripheral devices." G. DAVIS, COMPUTER
DATA PROCESSING 636 (2d ed. 1973).
87. 1 SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 14, at XLIII. Although agencies other than the
IRS are not permitted direct access to the Master Files, the specific information they request
is extracted and provided to them by the Service. States have direct access to magnetic
tapes of tax return information. 5 id. at 2630.
88. Id. at XLIV. E.g., The Commodity Exchange Authority of the Department of Agri-
culture operates its data banks under an express Congressional mandate requiring that its
findings be made available to other agencies upon request. 1 id. at 180.
89. Id. at XLIV. One agency using such procedures is the Department of the Army. Id.
table 6.
90. Id. at XLIV. E.g., the Appalachian Regional Commission. "Project data is public
information and governed by the Freedom of Information Act." Id. at 100. Most of the data
consists of economic information relating to the Appalachian Region, e.g., employment
statistics.
91. Id. at XLV. E.g., The U.S. Coast Guard permits public access to the Boating Regis-
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The security precautions utilized by the agencies differ. 2 Of the
471 agencies responding to the security inquiry, ninety-five percent
acknowledged that some level of precaution is taken to secure the
data from unauthorized access;93 hence, five percent of the agencies
admitted to engaging in no security arrangements whatsoever. 4
The most common security arrangement utilized by the agencies is
physical security. The systems vary from the very tight security
used for the White House Central files, which are electronically
coded and kept in locked, restricted access vaults under constant
Secret Service surveillance," to the shockingly lax security used for
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation files, 7 which are kept
only in ordinary locked file cabinets." Twenty-six percent of the
agencies claim that only a few people have the knowledge required
to access the data file and fifteen percent claimed that these sys-
tems are electronically safeguarded by highly sophisticated com-
puterized codes." One agency uses the most secure measure: de-
struction of the data when the purpose for which it was originally
collected is achieved.'
Two deficiencies emerge from these studies: the lack of statutory
authorization for both the gathering of sensitive information and
its subsequent compilation into data banks and the lack of ade-
tration and Motorboat Accident systems and allows relatives of subjects to see parts of the
Merchant Seaman Locator File. Id.
92. Id. table 8.
93. Id.
94. Id. E.g., Army statistical and administrative data banks. In response to the question
regarding security precautions for its highly sensitive Narcotic Offender File, which was es-
tablished to collect information as it relates to drug offenders within the U.S. Army and
which contains the name of the offender and the type of offense within the file, the subcom-
mittee received a "not applicable." 2 id. at 1176-77.
95. 1 id. table 8. The most common physical security methods are guarded entry, locked
files, etc. Id. See note 101 infra.
96-. SuBcoMMrrTEE STUDY, supra note 14, at LVII & table 8.
97. 5 id. at 2929-48. These files contain vast amounts of potentially derogatory informa-
tion, e.g., financial reports of individuals who have dealings with member banks. Id.
98. Id. at 2930. The Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Center Upward Mo-
bility File is "kept secure in the career development counselor's desk." 2 id. at 307.
99. 1 id. at XLVII. These special codes are part of the system's software. E.g., the De-
partment of Agriculture has a proposed data bank which will screen all requests for
information.
100. This is the practice of the Department of Defense, Installations and Logistics
Branch's Housing Referral Office data bank. 2 id. at 1341. The author of this study suggests
that if this practice were followed by other agencies there would be less need for developing
expensive and expansive means of security. 1 id. at XLVII.
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quate security measures within the majority of the agencies
surveyed. 0'
IV. The Present Legislative Scheme: the Freedom of
Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974
Present government information policy is regulated by the Free-
dom of Information Act 0 2 and the Privacy Act of 1974.103 Their in-
teraction is complex because the FOIA is generally viewed as a dis-
closure statute while the Privacy Act mandates nondisclosure.
Under the FOIA, government-held information must be disclosed
to any requesting individual unless the data falls into one of the
nine FOIA exemptions, in which case the decision to disclose falls
entirely within the discretion of the agency holding the informa-
tion. 10' The Privacy Act's Conditions of Disclosure section'0 5 reflects.
Congressional response to the potential for abuse of disclosure with
respect to the release of personal information and it is in this area
that the greatest conflict between the two statutes occurs. Subsec-
tion (b)(2) of the Privacy Act exempts materials the FOIA requires
to be disclosed from the general Privacy Act requirement that writ-
ten consent from the subject individual be obtained prior to disclo-
sure to third parties of information about the individual kept by
101. The Department of Investigation of the City of New York in its Guidelines for Com-
puter Security recommends that computer facilities be kept secure (1) physically: via
structural barriers; absence of windows in the computer equipment rooms; metal-covered
doors with hinges on the inside; any windows are to be alarmed; closed circuit television
monitoring; twenty-four hour guards; restriction of visitor access to preclude forced entry;
location of the room in an area where exposure to traffic is minimal; (2) electronically: ac-
cess restricted to designated individuals who require access in the performance of their offi-
cial duties; logical access to the data files and software protected by appropriate systems
software, password, and encryption algorithms; access control of remote terminals, and min-
imization of the use of the acoustic coupler, which is very insecure; (3) by risk management
procedures: each agency head is to evaluate sensitivity of the data and must assume that
hostile agents are prepared to take full advantage of significant system vulnerabilities. If the
risk is too high, top management may determine that automated support is unwarranted.
Protection should be commensurate with sensitivity. Department of Investigation of the City
of New York, Guidelines for Computer Security, (Systems Security Standard #GCS-1, pre-
pared by Rolf Moulton, issued on Mar. 1, 1979).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
103. Id. § 552a.
104. See note 111 infra.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that
"the FOIA applies to computer tapes to the same extent it applies to any other documents."
Rosenberg, Computer Files Found Not Exempt From FOIA, 13 Computerworld No. 49, at 16
(weekly ed. 1979).
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the agency. Thus, the most important issue in most disclosure dis-
putes is whether the requested information falls within the FOIA
disclosure requirements. In practice, the result has been that such
information, which falls within one of the nine exemptions of the
FOIA and thus not required to be disclosed, will be withheld from
the requesting individual. Conversely, as courts interpret the FOIA
disclosure mandates more broadly, less material can be regulated
by the Privacy Act.
A. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Many of the agencies surveyed by the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights' °1 cited the FOIA as their guideline for allowing in-
dividuals the opportunity to review their own files. The Freedom of
Information Act regulates the disclosure of government-held data.
Its mandate to disclose information to individuals reflects the same
concerns raised by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.07
Under the FOIA, an individual is allowed access to agency opin-
ions, policy statements, and agency manuals and instructions that
affect the public interest.'" An agency that refuses to allow any
individual access to such information forfeits its right to use the
material against the individual.'"' The FOIA allows an agency to
delete from the information granted to a requesting party names of
private individuals if disclosure thereof would constitute an exces-
sive invasion of the subject's privacy."10 Unless the information falls
within one of the nine FOIA exemptions from the disclosure rule,"'
third parties are frequently granted access too readily because the
ultimate decision of whether to disclose information is-left up to the
106. See pt. Ill supra.
107. Id.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
109. Id. § 552(a)(1)-(2).
110. Id. § 552(a)(2).
111. Briefly, the exemptions are: (1) Matters which are properly classified as secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy by an executive order; (2) Information that
is related exclusively to an agency's internal personnel rules; (3) Matters which are ex-
empted from disclosure by a statute other than FOIA; (4) Trade secrets and confidential
commercial or financial information; (5) Inter- or intra- agency memoranda not available by
law to another party; (6) Files, such as personnel or medical files, which constitute an un-
warranted invasion of privacy; (7) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses; (8) Information gathered by an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions; and (9) Geological or geographical information concerning wells. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
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agency itself."' The FOIA further provides that if certain informa-
tion is subject to an exemption, the exempted data should be seg-
regated from the body of the record, the remainder to be released
to the individual seeking the data."' An individual may challenge
an agency's refusal to release data in the United States District
Court. The FOIA grants the court the power to order record pro-
duction." ' Courts will arrive at a decision by balancing the privacy
of the individual who is the topic of the data and the public's right
to know the information."' Generally, if the person seeking disclo-
sure is the subject of the data, access will be more readily granted
than would be if he were a member of the general public because in
the former situation there may not be an invasion of the individ-
ual's privacy."'
The FOIA disallows the subject of the record certain access
thereto, although revelation would be crucial to his privacy inter-
ests. Especially troublesome in this area are exemptions one," 7
four,"' six,"' and seven."" Exemption one permits denial of access
if the data is determined to be essential to national security. 2' The
President may, in his discretion, establish that an item is one of
national security and thus eliminate it from the public domain.
The fourth exemption exempts trade secrets and commercial infor-
mation from disclosure where such information was given with the
112. Congress, however, cannot be denied any data, private or otherwise. Id. § 552(c)
(1976).
113. "Any reasonable segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person re-
questing such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection."
Id. § 552(b).
114. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
115. Thus, newsmen frequently have brought suit to compel disclosure of information in
their capacity as information-bearers to the public. E.g., Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp.
107 (D.D.C. 1975); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
116. See Black v. Sheraton Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974). Here, a subject
of an F.B.I. investigation was granted access to his file because it did not involve a law
enforcement proceeding and the file had been closed for quite a while prior to suit.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). Le., national security data. See note 111 supra.
118. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). I.e., trade secrets and confidential commercial or
financial information. See note 111 supra.
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). Le., personnel, medical, or other intimate files. See note
111 supra.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). I.e., investigatory law enforcement records. See note 111
supra.
121. See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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expectation of confidentiality.' Under the sixth exemption, the
disclosure of personnel, medical, and other files, which would con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of individual privacy, is prohib-
ited.'23 Finally, the seventh exemption requires that law enforce-
ment files be kept secret if disclosure thereof would interfere with
the criminal process or deprive a defendant of a constitutional
right. 2'
The sixth and seventh exemptions are most likely to affect an
individual by prohibiting disclosure of information which is clearly
sensitive and potentially erosive of individual privacy.2 5 The most
frequent argument made against these two exemptions is that the
public may have a genuine interest in the data. An equitable solu-
tion to this conflict is the one subscribed to by the United States
Supreme Court in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,'2 wherein
the Court ordered disclosure of the information about military
honor codes only after identification of individual subjects was re-
moved.12 This ruling did not impair the value of the data because
identification of the individuals in the file was immaterial to the
interested public.
B. The Privacy Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress passed an amendment to the FOIA,12 ' popu-
larly known as the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act),'" to restrict the
ease of disclosure to third parties inherent under the FOIA. 30 The
122. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), appeal for stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971); Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.),
rehearing en banc denied, 555 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
In Stone, the court denied disclosure of the terms of a loan made to a Soviet bank, reading
the statute as stating that the bank was a "person" expecting confidentiality of a trade
secret.
123. See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
124. See National Public Radio v. Bell, 431 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1977).
125. See Comment, Freedom of Information Act: the Expansion of Exemption Six, 27 U.
FiA. L. REV. 848 (1975).
126. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
127. Id. at 380.
128. See pt. IV(A) supra.
129. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)). The note
accompanying the Privacy Act explains that the need for specific legislation to safeguard a
"personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States" is a
reaction to the increasing use of sophisticated technology in collecting and disseminating
information for the Government. Id.
130. See text accompanying notes 117-27 supra.
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Act also attempts to ease an individual's access to records kept
about him. Subject individuals are able, under this Act, to gain
access to information still maintained in secrecy pursuant to one of
the exemptions of the FOIA.'3' The Act provides the subject of the
data some control over the information that has been collected
about him. 3 The subject may: 1) determine what records are col-
lected; 3 2) have access to the records and correct discrepancies; 3
and 3) prevent nonconsensual transferral of the information
amongst agencies or other individuals."5 An individual must be
given a copy of his record upon request from the agency that main-
tains the data.' Upon receipt of such copy, the subject has the
right to request that the information collection agency correct or
131. See note 111 supra.
132. Congress stated its findings as follows:
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal. information by Federal agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology, while
essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified the
harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use or
dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance, and credit,
and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endangered by the misuse
of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution of the United States.
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896.
133. This is effected by the requirement that:
Each agency, with respect to each system of records under its control, shall -
(1) . ..keep an accurate accounting of -
(A) the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of a record to any person
or to another agency made under subsection (b) of this section; and
(B) the name and address of the person or agency to whom the disclosure is
made;
(2) retain the accounting made under paragraph (1) of this subsection for at least
five years or the life of the record, whichever is longer, after the disclosure for which
the accounting is made;
(3) except for disclosures made under subsection (b)(7) of this section [criminal
law enforcement activity], make the accounting . .. available to the individual
named in the record at his request;
5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (1976).
134. Id. § 552a(d).
135. Id. § 552a(b).
136. The Act states:
"[Ulpon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertain-
ing to him which is contained in the system, [the agency shall] permit him . . . to review
the record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to
him. ... Id. § 552(d)(1).
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amend any portion of the record which is inaccurate, incomplete,
irrelevant or untimely.'37 The subject is entitled to administrative
review3' should the agency deny such a request and to judicial re-
view in the district court.' The district court is given jurisdiction
to hear suits brought under the Privacy Act if: 1) a request to
amend has been denied by the reviewing officer;4 0 2) administra-
tive review of refusal to amend has been denied;'' 3) requests to
access the records have been denied;'" 4) an inaccurate, untimely,
irrelevant, or incomplete record has led to an adverse determina-
tion as regards the subject individual;"' and 5) an individual has
been adversely affected by any other failure to comply with the
Act.' The court has the power to inspect the records in camera to
determine whether the information has been withheld unjustifiably
and, in its discretion, to order the agency to amend the record."'
Prior to disclosure of an individual's record to a third party,'
the disclosing agency must obtain the individual's consent'47 and
137. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(b)(i).
138. Such administrative review is to be accorded the subject within thirty working days.
If amendment is still refused, the subject has the right to file a statement of reasons for
amendment which must be included with every disclosure of the record. Id. § 552a(d)(3).
139. Id. § 552a(g)(1). The courts, though, are often reluctant to curb disclosure of infor-
mation which they feel is legitimately necessary to either another agency or to the public
interest. Thus, in Jaffess v. HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court felt that
"[tihe present thrust of decisional law does not include within its compass the right of an
individual to prevent disclosure by one governmental agency to another of matters obtained
in the course of transmitting the agency's regular functions." Id. at 629. In Tennessean
Newspapers, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), the court granted the local
press access to information about arrests and indictments from the United States Attorney's
office, asserting that there exists a legitimate public interest in discovering the identity of
criminal suspects.
140. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(B).
143. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C).
144. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
145. Id. § 552a(g)(3)(A). Thus, in Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F. Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976),
the court decided to conduct an in camera evaluation of the records the plaintiff was seeking
to inspect since the dossier contained evaluations of plaintiff which had been submitted to
the government in connection with plaintiffs application for a position with the Social Se-
curity Administration. The judge noted that the in camera evaluation was necessary in order
to make it simpler for the court to balance the competing privacy interests of the individual
who seeks to see his records against those of the supplier of the information who has written
a frank evaluation with the expectation of confidentiality. Id. at 1207,
146. See pt. IV(A) supra.
147. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5)-(6).
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make a reasonable attempt to insure that the record is accurate
and complete." 8 There are four extremely broad exceptions to this
consent prerequisite. These are: disclosure 1) to officers and em-
ployees of the agency who need the information in the performance
of their duties;"' 2) under the FOIA;' 0 3) for "routine use";'" and
4) for law enforcement purposes. "2 Each agency must maintain an
accurate accounting of the data, nature, and purpose of each re-
cord's disclosure5 3 for at least five years after disclosure or for the
life of the record, whichever is longer. "' The accounting must in-
clude each recipient's name and address. " Upon request, the sub-
ject must have this record of accounting made available to him.' 5
The Privacy Act provides for criminal penalties where: 1) an of-
ficer or employee of the agency willfully disclosed individually
identifiable information to someone who is not a proper recipient; 15
2) an officer or employee of the agency maintains a system of
records in contravention to the notice requirements of the stat-
ute; "' and 3) any person requests or obtains any record under false
pretenses knowingly and willfully."' In addition to criminal sanc-
tions against individual offenders,' 0 the Act establishes liability of
the United States where an agency is found to have acted "willfully
148. Id. § 552a(b).
149. Id. § 552a(b)(1).
150. Id. § 552a(b)(2). For a discussion of the interplay between the FOIA and the Privacy
Act, see text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (1976). The term "routine use" is defined in the Act as "the
use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected." Id. § 552a(a)(7). The courts tend to leave the agencies with the discretion of
determining what the term "routine use" means in the context of that agency. See American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) v. Defense General Supply Center, 423 F.
Supp. 481 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(7). For a discussion of the severe and repeated repercussions of
disclosure of law enforcement data contained in drug abuse data banks, see SUBCOMM. ON
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIAl Y, 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,. DRUG
ABUSE DATA BANKS: CASE STUDIES IN THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY (1974).
153. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1)(A) (1976).
154. Id. § 552a(c)(2).
155. Id. § 552a(c)(1)(B).
156. Id. § 552a(d)(1).
157. Id. § 552a(i)(1).
158. Id. § 552a(i)(2).
159. Id. § 552a(i)(3).
160. The offending party is charged with a misdemeanor and fined up to a maximum of
$5,000. Id. § 552a(i)(1).
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or intentionally.""'
The Privacy Act of 1974 created the Privacy Protection Study
Commission (the Commission)' to investigate the personal data
recordkeeping practices of governmental and private organizations
and to recommend to the President and Congress the extent to
which the Privacy Act of 1974 should be applied to these organiza-
tions. After two years of study, the Commission concluded that,
although the 1974 Act is a large step forward," 3 it has been unable
to achieve all of its most significant goals. 6 ' The individual was not
afforded, within reason, sufficiently extensive access to his
records.6 5 The Commission recommended that the ambiguous lan-
guage found in the Act be clarified to harmonize variations of inter-
pretation. 6' The Commission also suggested an amendment to the
Act requiring that the record, when disclosed to the subject indi-
vidual, reflect as closely as possible the form and use of the record
as found within the agency"7 and that an agency supply informa-
tion from "derivative records." '  The Commission argued that
these changes were necessary to enable the individual to exercise
his right to correct, amend, or dispute a record once he has gained
access to it."'
The Commission also found a need to regulate the procedures
governing access to information by third parties. It was suggested
161. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A) - (B). The United States is liable to the plaintiff either for the
actual damages sustained or $1,000, whichever is greater, plus reasonable costs and attorney
fees. Id.
162. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1905(b)(1), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179 (1977).
163. THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY, 502 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PERSONAL PRIVACY].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 502-06. Some of the changes the Commission recommends include redefining
"record" to include attributes and other personal characteristics assigned to an individual;
adding the term "accessible record" to delineate those individually indentifiable records that
ought to be available to an individual in response to an access request. Id. at 504.
167. Id. app. 4, at 121 (assessing the Privacy Act of 1974). The Commission feels that
this requirement would assist an individual in determining the manner in which to exercise
his right to correct, amend, or dispute a record to which he gains access. Id.
168. A "derivative record" is a substantially similar or derivative version tht falls within
the definition of an "accessible record." There may be two kinds of derivative records: (1)
exact duplicates of the original record maintained in another part of the agency; and (2)
some portion of the original which has been copied and subsequently amended or merged
with other records. Id. at 122.
169. Id. at 121.
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that the agency be required to keep an accounting of disclosures of
the subject's record both within the agency and by outside par-
ties. 10 Records could be used internally only for the purpose for
which they were originally collected;' 7 ' external disclosures would
have to be certified by an agency official responsible for overseeing
the Act's implementation."' The Commission also recommended
that the collection and maintenance of records by an agency be
performed only when authorized by statute 73 and that as much in-
formation as is practical be collected from the subject individual.",
An individual should be allowed, if possible, to decide without co-
ercion whether to disclose the information."' In the event a correc-
tion of the record is received, such information would be forwarded
both to sources that supplied erroneous information and prior
recipients."'
The final report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission was
transmitted to President Carter, Vice-President Mondale and
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill on July 12, 1977."'7 The pro-
posed privacy legislation (discussed in part IV) is based on the
Commission study. The proposals attempt to resolve the Privacy
Act's deficiencies by utilizing the Commission's suggestions as well
as making further additions.
V. Present Legislative Proposals: Privacy Protection Within
an Information-Oriented Society
A. The Privacy of Research Records Act
The Privacy of Research Records Act,"8 proposed as an amend-
ment to the Privacy Act of 1974,"1' is designed to provide those in-
170. Id. at 122.
171. Id. at 125. I.e., use of the record must fit within the routine use definition as revised.
See note 151 infra, for the Privacy Act of 1974 definition of routine use.
172. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 163, app. 4, at 125.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 126.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 127-28. It is the Commission's opinion that placing the responsibility for mak-
ing corrections on the agency keeping the records is appropriate because there is no other
way for the individual to safeguard against the spread of incorrect information about himself
among federal government agencies. Id. at 128.
177. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 163, at III-VII (introductory letters).
178. S. 867, supra note 16. This bill was introduced by Senator Ribicoff on April 4, 1979
and has been referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
179. See pt. IV(b) supra.
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dividuals who are the subjects of federally funded research with
necessary privacy safeguards. 8 ' Seeking to invalidate many of the
current policies of government agencies, the Act mandates that ag-
gregate research results be published in such a form as to make it
difficult to associate the subject individual with the statistical
data. "' It is clear that statistical studies undertaken for research
purposes by their nature pose a less significant threat to the right
of privacy than systems established specifically to collect data on
individuals. Therefore, this proposed bill defines the term "record"
very narrowly to include data which is related or traceable to indi-
vidual subjects. 8 '
Intimate information may be published with the consent of cer-
tain named parties'83 as long as the consent is freely given and is
not compensated for in any way.8 4 Without consent, such informa-
tion may be published only in a medical emergency, 8 ' or under a
judicial order issued with the intent to aid in the investigation of a
transgression of the law by either the person or the agency that has
conducted the research.' Notwithstanding these two exceptions,
180. S. 867, supra note 16, § b.
181. Such de-personalization of information is accomplished by storing the information
as percentage statistics. That this solution does not impede the utilization of the research
has been demonstrated by the Supreme Court's holding in Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 353 (1976). For a discussion of this case see note 126 supra and accompanying
text.
182. A "record" means:
(A) normal directory information;
(B) numbers, symbols, fingerprints, voiceprints, photographs, or any identifying particu-
lars associated with an individual;
(C) information relating to an individual's background, education, finances, health, crimi-
nal or employment history;
(D) any other attributes or affiliations associated with the individual.
S. 867, supra note 16, § 552c(a)(1).
183. The consent of the following parties is deemed adequate:
(A) the subject individual;
(B) the parent or guardian of a subject under twelve years of age or of one who has been
declared an incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(C) the administrator, executor, or trustee of a decedent's estate;
(D) a decedent's heir or next of kin.
Id. § 552c(b)(1).
184. Id.
185. Id. § 552c(b)(2)(A). However, the person must be notified within a reasonable time
after the disclosure. Id.
186. Id. § 552c(b)(2)(B). Information obtained under this latter exception may be used
only against the agency that has maintained the record and not against the person who is
the record subject. Id. § (b)(2)(B)(i).
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individual identity may not be disclosed unless identity is crucial
in proving the violations'87 and the subject has been apprised of the
intended disclosure beforehand.'88 Information may be released to
statutorily authorized research auditors who, like the Federal Infor-
mation Practices Board, 8' are absolutely forbidden from further
disclosure of the data."' The research agency may contact the sub-
ject individuals only if it is necessary to accomplish the research
purpose more fully and in such a manner "that minimizes the risk
of harm, embarrassment, or other adverse consequences to the in-
dividual."'' For example, in Rural Housing Alliance v. United
States Department of Agriculture,"' information about recipients
of government housing assistance which contained data about indi-
viduals' marital status, legitimacy of children, medical histories
and similarly intimate information had been collected by the De-
partment of Agriculture as part of a study of discriminatory hous-
ing practices. The plaintiff, the Rural Housing Alliance, a private
organization, contended that racial and national origin contributed
to discrimination in arranging government loans for housing, and
sought a copy of the report. Upon denial of such by the govern-
ment, it brought suit to compel disclosure. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, reversing the district court's order of
disclosure, remanded the case for a reevaluation of the threat to
the privacy interests of the study's subjects."3 Holding that the
plaintiff did have a legitimate interest in obtaining the informa-
tion, the court nonetheless concluded that to open the private lives
of the study subjects to additional scrutiny would unduly violate
their expectations of confidentiality and would expose the individu-
als to embarrassment or possible reprisals."' The court recom-
mended that alternative sources for the same information be ex-
plored and that the possibility of the Rural Housing Alliance
independently asking the individuals for the same information be
187. Id. § 552c(b)(2)(B)(ii).
188. Id. § 552c(b)(2).
189. See pt. V(B) infra.
190. See note 222 infra.
191. S. 867, supra note 16, § 552c(b)(2)(C)(iii).
192. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 511 F.2d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
193. " [T]he .. .order as framed would permit release of intimate details concerning
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considered.' The proposed Privacy of Research Records Act would
codify this holding.
Despite a determination that a research purpose would be ac-
complished more fully with disclosure of the record, the agency
that maintains the records, prior to disclosure, must conduct the
classic privacy balancing test of weighing the harm that disclosure
might inflict on the individual against the exigency for full expo-
sure of the information. The justification for disclosure must
clearly warrant the risk.' The recipient of such confidential infor-
mation must protect against any further dissemination by utilizing
"reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to
prevent unauthorized use or disclosure of research records,""' 7 and
by destroying the identifying data once need for it ceases. The re-
cipient of such information must also sign an affidavit promising to
follow these regulations."8 The compiler of the data has the obliga-
tion, at or before collection, to give the subject individual notice if
there is a possibility that such information might be further dis-
closed."' Recontact with the subject individual is prohibited absent
special approval,100 and then only after stringent precautions are
taken to minimize risk or embarrassment, unless protraction would
cause imminent danger to private or public health."0 ' However,
even emergency contact must be made in such a manner as to pro-
tect the privacy of the individual.' 2 None of the research data may
be used against the subject without his consent."3 Any violations of
this act are punishable by both criminal penalties °0 and civil dam-
age judgments against the offending individual or agency. 08
195. Id. at 78.
196. S. 867, supra note 16, § 552c(b)(2)(D)(ii).
197. Id. § 552c(iii)(I).
198. Id. § 552c(iv). If the recipient of information from a collector of data breaches this
signed agreement, he is punishable by a fine of up to $50,000. Id. § 552c(j).
199. Id. § 552c(c).
200. Id. § 552c(d)(3) & (4). The approval must come from either the person or agency
that most recently collected any of the information in the record directly from the individual
or an institutional review board or comparable organization prescribed by the agency. Id. §
552c(d)(2).
201. Id. § 552c(d)(4).
202. Id.
203. Id. § 552c(e)(1). The consent must be in writing. Id.
204. "Any person who knowingly discloses information in violation of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than $5,000 in the case of a first
offense and not more than $20,000 in the case of each subsequent offense." Id. § 552c(h).
205. Id. § 552c(i). The damages recoverable may be actual damages, general damages,
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Doe v. McMillan,2" decided before the enactment of the Privacy
Act of 1974, is illustrative of the type of conduct which would be
governed by the Privacy of Research Records Act. In this case, a
suit was brought against members of the House of Representatives,
the District of Columbia School Board, the principal of the school
involved and a myriad of other defendants. The plaintiffs were par-
ents of children who attended a school which was the subject of a
highly derogatory report. Throughout this report, problems con-
cerning specifically named students were discussed. Plaintiffs re-
quested an injunction and compensatory damages.w The parents
alleged that the disclosure was a violation of statutory, constitu-
tional, and common law rights to privacy and was damaging to the
future reputation and good names of the children."' The defend-
ants answered that the disclosure was made pursuant to its man-
date to keep the public informed. Additionally, the defendants as-
serted that governmental immunity prevented prosecution and
barred liability. 09 The Court rejected defendants' immunity claim.
However, because it was uncertain whether the stated function of
Congress would be seriously undermined by nondisclosure of the
individuals' identities, the Court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether such disclosure was outside the sphere of legiti-
mate legislative activity. 10
and any equitable relief deemed proper. Id. It is interesting to note that this type of damage
recovery had already been delineated by Warren and Brandeis as early as 1890. Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 2, at 213.
206. 412 U.S. 306 (1972).
207. Id. at 309-10.
208. The most interesting part of their damage claim was that the District of Columbia
School Board establish rules and regulations regarding the right of privacy of the children of
the District of Columbia. Id. at 310 n.3. See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
437 (1971), where the Court advised caution "[wihere a person's good name, reputation,
honor or integrity is at stake b~cause of what the government is doing to him."
209. 412 U.S. at 317. To hold otherwise, the defendants contended, would cause Congress
to be fearful of properly executing its duties. Id.
210. Id. at 324. Douglas, in his concurring opinion, concluded that the privacy balance
weighed more heavily in favor of the subjects and that the functions of the report would
have served equally well if the students had remained anonymous.
We all should be painfully aware of the potentially devastating effects of congressional
accusations. There are great stakes involved when officials condemn individuals by
name. The age of technology has produced data banks into which all social security
numbers go; and following those numbers go data in designated categories concerning
the lives of members of our communities. Arrests go in, though many arrests are un-
constitutional . . . . [Ailleged misdeeds or indiscretions may be devastating to a
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The Privacy of Research Records Act codifies the Court's deci-
sion in McMillan. The nondisclosure of personal identifying infor-
mation does not detract from the usefulness of statistical data,
whereas disclosure of such information would constitute a serious
invasion of privacy interests.
B. Federal Information and Privacy Board Act of 1978
The Federal Information and Privacy Board Act of 197811 pro-
poses to establish a five-member board"' to serve as a monitoring
body for all potential infringements of privacy rights. The responsi-
bilities of the Board would be:"' 1) to continually oversee the gen-
eral effect that information and data collection have on individual
privacy;"' 2) to investigate and assist agencies to comply with the
laws"5 and policies concerned with information dissemination;", 3)
to assist agencies in developing rules to comply with privacy laws
and establish model privacy retention procedures;" 7 4) to aid those
person.
Id. at 329-30.
211. H.R. 350, supra note 17. The Federal Information and Privacy Board Act of 1978
was introduced by Rep. Barry Goldwater, Jr., in the House of Representatives on January
15, 1979 and has been referred to the Committee on Government Operations. Unlike the
Privacy of Research Records Act, which sets up guidelines to be followed only by research
collecting institutions, this Act seeks to establish a general information overseeing agency.
See pt. V(A) supra for a discussion of the Privacy of Research Records Act.
212. The members are to be appointed by the President with the Senate's approval and
will include persons knowledgeable in law, civil rights and liberties, business, records man-
agement, computer technology, communications technology, law enforcement, and informa-
tion security. H.R. 350, supra note 17, § 2(b).
213. Id. § 3(a).
214. Id. § 3(a)(1).
215. Id. § 3(a)(2). The list of laws which are able to be complied with includes but is not
limited to:
(A) the FOIA;
(B) the Privacy Act of 1974;
(C) the Government in the Sunshine Act;
(D) the Fair Credit Reporting Act;
(E) the Fair Credit Billing Act;
(F) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.
Id.
216. Id. § 3(a)(3). Such information practices include:
(A) transnational data flows;
(B) electronic funds transfer;
(C) criminal history information;
(D) collection, maintenance, and use of census information.
Id.
217. Id. § 3(a)(4)-(5).
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individuals who complain of a violation of the law;"' 5) to report
annually to the President and Congress on its activities and make
recommendations; 19 and 6) to submit to the subject agency, the
President, and Congress the results of any investigation it under-
takes.2 0 The Board would be given the authority to hold hearings
and take sworn testimony and would be accorded privileges equal
to any other governmental entity.' It would be granted unlimited
access to all information that any government agency possesses,
but would be prohibited from disclosing this information to third
parties.2 In this way, the Act prevents the unintentional establish-
ment of an organization resembling the National Data Center.2 3
Any information that is published in one of its reports must be de-
void of all data which might directly or indirectly implicate the
individual subject of the information. 4
C. The Omnibus Right to Privacy Act
The Omnibus Right to Privacy Act of 1979,25 which states as its
purpose the protection of the privacy of individuals from both gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental intrusion, is the most comprehen-
sive of all of the privacy proposals made to date.2" It encompasses
the entire privacy scheme presented above and incorporates the en-
218. Id. § 3(a)(6).
219. Id. § 3(a)(8).
220. Id. § 3(a)(9).
221. Id. § 3(b). This includes the use of the mails and administrative support services.
Id. §§ 3(b)(4)-(5).
222. Id. § 4(a)(1).
223. The advantages and drawbacks of a NDC have already been discussed. See pt. II
supra.
224. H.R. 350, supra note 17, § 4(b)(1)(B).
225. H.R. 2465 was introduced before the House of Representatives on February 27, 1979
by Rep. Preyer, for himself and Rep. Goldwater. Currently, it is moving within the Govern-
ment Operations Committee. Alan R. Severson, the legislative director for Rep. Goldwater,
has stated that the hearings on this bill will be taking place sometime in early February. It
is possible that the bill will be passed as a whole although it is more likely that only certain
sections will be accepted and others rejected. In addition, it may be that S. 867, supra note
16 (the Privacy of Research Records Act), and H.R. 350, supra note 17 (the Federal Infor-
mation and Privacy Board Act), will be combined with this Act. The result may be one all-
encompassing act which will deal with the privacy issues raised in each. Interview with Alan
R. Severson, Legislative Director, Office of Rep. Barry Goldwater, Jr., Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 26, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Interview].
226. For a discussion of the Privacy of Research Records Act and the Federal Information
and Practices Board Act, see pts. V(A) & (B) supra.
1979-801
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tire tests of certain pre-existing proposals. 27 The Act is divided into
eight titles which individually address important specific aspects of
privacy law. These titles are preceded by an introduction delineat-
ing the findings and purposes of the Act."'
In its introduction, the Act recognizes: 1) that "the right to pri-
vacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution of the United States";22 2) the need for balancing the free
flow of information essential to a democratic society against the
protection of personal privacy rights; 3 ' 3) the increasing accumula-
tion of extensive amounts of private information by various govern-
ment agencies;2 31 4) that the collection, maintenance, use and dis-
semination of such information has a direct effect on individual
privacy; 32 5) that more information is used and disseminated by
agencies which have had no direct dealings with the individual; 33
6) that an individual has the right to control personal information
about himself;2 3' 7) that the misuse of information may hamper an
individual's employment, credit and other societal benefits; 235 and
8) that presently, neither law nor technology provide the individual
with adequate record safeguards. 3 ' As a result of these findings, the
Act enunciates its purposes as the following: 1) to balance what an
individual must reveal to recordkeepers against what the individ-
ual seeks to gain;27 2) to reveal recordkeeping operations; 3 and 3)
to delineate obligations as the quid pro quo for the use and disclo-
sure of private information. 3 '
Because the Act is a comprehensive coverage of all facets of pri-
vacy infringement, its titles deal with both private and govern-
227. One such proposal is the Federal Information and Practices Board Act. See pt. V(B)
supra.
228. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 2(a) & (b). These findings are similar to those of the
SUBCOMMITrEE STUDY, supra note 14, and the LINOWES SURVEY, supra note 14. In fact, much
of Linowes' research has been the groundwork for the drafting of this Bill. See pt. III supra.
229. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 2(a)(1).
230. Id. § 2(a)(2).
231. Id. § 2(a)(3).
232. Id. § 2(a)(4).
233. Id. § 2(a)(5).
234. Id. § 2(a)(6).
235. Id. § 2(a)(7).
236. Id. § 2(a)(8).
237. Id. § 2(b)(1).
238. Id. § 2(b)(2).
239. Id. § 2(b)(3).
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ment-initiated collection and maintenance of information. The for-
mer will be dealt with only briefly.
1. Title I: Federal Information and Privacy Board Act of 1979240
Title I is a per verba incorporation of the Federal Information
and Privacy Board Act of 1978.241 As discussed above, this title
seeks to establish a Board as an overseer and enforcer of privacy
safeguards of data collection in both the governmental and nongov-
ernmental sectors.24 2
2. Title II: Privacy Act Amendments of 1979243
The introductory section of this Act defines terms to be used
throughout the Act. Although some of the terms appear within the
original Privacy Act of 1974,244 this Act provides both additional
terms and expands on included terms,245 consistent with the recom-
mendations of the Privacy Protection Study 'Commission. 241 The
Act establishes guidelines for the solicitation, collection, mainte-
nance, correction and disclosure of personal information 47 to insure
that an individual can make an informed and uncoerced decision
to disclose the requested information. The Act requires that a pu-
tative subject be supplied with certain information delineating the
privacy safeguards which the agency is guaranteeing prior to disclo-
sure. 48 As a limitation on the agency's powers of collection and in
240. Id. § 101-06.
241. See pt. V(B) supra.
242. Id. See note 225 supra.
243. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 201. Although in purpose this is identical to S. 867,
supra note 16, their execution would differ, i.e., where S. 867 seeks to add a new section, §
552c, this Act amends the existent § 552a, which is the Privacy Act of 1974 itself.
244. See pt. IV(B) supra.
245. The additional terms include: individually identifiable record; accessible record;
system; subsystem; routine use; collateral. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(a).
246. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
247. The last section of the proposal prohibits any federal action, until a specific statute
is drafted to the contrary, that would promote the development of a standard universal per-
sonnel identifier or central population register, i.e., something akin to the NDC is rejected
again. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(c). For a definition of the universal personnel identi-
fier see note 45 supra.
248. The information which each agency must make available to the individual includes:
(i) the authority for solicitation of the information; (ii) whether disclosure is mandatory
or voluntary and the consequences of not providing the information; (iii) the principal pur-
pose for which the information will be used; (iv) any routine or collateral uses which could
be reasonably expected to flow from disclosure; (v) additional information that may be
used to verify that disclosed; (vi) the title, business address, and telephone number of the
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order to eliminate the random and unnecessary collection of sensi-
tive data, the Act allows the compilation of only those records that
are relevant to accomplishing a purpose of the agency which a stat-
ute or presidential order authorizes." ' The Act, however, does not
prohibit agencies from collecting or maintaining information that is
either expressly authorized by the subject individual or serves a
reasonable and proper reference function.5 0 In addition, each
agency has the duty 1) to maintain accurate records in order to
assure fair determinations as to the individual about whom the
records are maintained;2' 2) to assure confidentiality and security
by establishing adequate administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards; 22 and 3) to give subject individuals notice of disclosure
under compulsory legal process.253 No agency may collect or main-
tain information that in any way describes an expression by an in-
dividual in the exercise of his first amendment rights254 unless it is
in the course of an authorized investigation into illegal activities.255
Every federal agency is responsible for verifying the accuracy of
the records maintained by both prior sources and subsequent recip-
ients. This requires an affirmative duty to notify such sources and
agency official who will answer any questions the individual may have; and (vii) when in-
formation is collected for a research or statistical purpose, the possibility of it being dis-
closed in individually identifiable form. If disclosure is made for any other purpose, the indi-
vidual must be informed that he will be promptly notified of such disclosure. H.R. 2465,
supra note 18, § 202(k)(3)(A).
249. Id. § 202(e)(1)(C). See note 64 supra, for an example of a statutorily authorized
purpose. As found by the Subcommittee, more than eighteen percent of the agencies collect
information without any statutory authority while only sixteen percent use express statutory
authority. SUBcOMMITTEE STUDY, supra note 14, table 3.
250. For example, a library, bibliographic or abstracting use. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, §
202(e)(2)(D)(ii).
251. Id. § 202(e)(1)(D). The Central Intelligence Agency or other criminal enforcement
agencies, as exceptions, keep unverified information but must identify it clearly to users or
recipients as such. Id.
252. Id. § 202(e)(1)(E).
253. Id. § 202(e)(1)(F).
254. Id. § 202(e)(2)(A). .e., the content of any public publications, speech, or other ex-
pression of belief or argument. Id.
255. Id. § 202(e)(2)(B). Thus, the stationing of undercover police officers in classrooms
where meetings of university-sponsored organizations were conducted was held to be a viola-
tion of first amendent rights and the right to privacy. Gathering information for intelligence
reports that did not pertain to illegal activity was permanently enjoined due to the lack of a
compelling state interest. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975). See also Comment, Police Surveillance of Political Dissidents, 4 COL. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. REV. 101 (1972).
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recipients of all corrections to, or statements of disagreements with,
the individually identifiable records. 5 ' An exception to this. notifi-
cation requirement is where one received the information in accor-
dance with the FOIA. 257
Research and statistical records kept by an agency are barred
from disclosure in identifiable form with four exceptions: 1) the
agency reasonably believes that disclosure will prevent imminent
physical injury to an individual, "provided that the information
disclosed is limited to that information necessary to secure the pro-
tection of the individual who may be injured; 2  2) a judicial order
commands the release of such record to aid an inquiry into a viola-
tion of law, as long as the information obtained is used as evidence
only against the agency maintaining the research. The information
can only be disclosed in such form as to bar disclosure of the sub-
ject individual, unless such is necessary to prove the violation and
the individual is given prior notice and the opportunity to contest
its disclosure; 259 3) the purpose of the disclosure is to conduct a
statutorily authorized audit of the research program;2 0 or 4) disclo-
sure to the National Archives and Records Service. 26'
Agencies that maintain individually identifiable records are re-
quired to make an annual disclosure of the systems maintained,
the manner in which they are used, authority for maintenance of
the system, the types of individuals about whom records are main--
tained, each use and disclosure, and agency policies regarding ac-
cess security and individual amendment of personal records.2 2 One
official is to be designated to oversee the proper implementation of
this Act by personnel within each agency. 63
An aggrieved subject individual may bring a civil action for
breach of the requirements of this Act against the offending agency
256. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(f)(1).
257. Id. § 202(f)(2)(A).
258. Id. § 202(g)(1)(A). This same requirement is contained within the Privacy of Re-
search Records Act. See pt. V(A) supra.
259. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(g)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
260. Id. § 202(g)(1)(C).
261. Id. § 202(g)(1)(D). Similar provisions are contained in S. 867, supra note 16.
262. This detailed information is to be published in the Federal Register. H.R. 2465,
supra note 18, § 202(h)(1)(A)-(I).
263. Such designated official is to issue standards for implementation of this section and
to take reasonable affirmative steps to see to it that all agency employees are aware of the
requirements of this section. Id. § 202(j)(1)(A)-(C).
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in a district court of competent jurisdiction. The court may order
any or all of the following remedies:"0 ' 1) an award of reasonable
attorney fees and litigation costs;' 5 2) a mandate to the agency to
correct the individual's records;2" 3) an injunction against the
agency to refrain from withholding the records and to make an ac-
counting of all uses and disclosures of the particular record;267 and
4) where the conduct of the agency is found to be intentional or
willful, the award of special and general damages, not less than
$1,000 or more than $10,000, to be assessed against the United
States." The action must be brought within either two years of the
misrepresentation or two years of its discovery." ' In addition, an
official or employee of the agency or a recipient of the information
who has willfully and knowingly disclosed information to one who
is unauthorized to receive it is subject to misdemeanor charges.270
Any independent contractor who performs an authorized function
of the federal agency is treated as its agent; the agency could there-
fore, as principal, be held criminally liable for the infraction.27'
Civil liability would, in such case, rest with the contractor. 2
Under the proposed Act, any proposal by an agency to either ex-
pand an extant system 73 or establish a new one must first be
cleared by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget af-
ter it is evaluated in terms of its potential impact on privacy.2,
The President would be required to submit an annual, consolidated
report to Congress, setting forth the number of records contained in
each federal agency's system. 2 5 Where this proposed section con-
264. Id. § 202(k).
265. Id. § 202(k)(2)(B).
266. Id. § 202(k)(2)(A).
267. Id. § 202(k)(3)(A).
268. Id. § 202(k)(4)(A).
269. Id. § 202(k)(5).
270. Id. § 202(l)(1).
271. Id. § 202(m).
272. Id. § 202(m)(3)(B).
273. The term "system" or "subsystem" means any collection or grouping of individ-
ually identifiable records which is systematically filed, stored, or otherwise main-
tained according to some established retrieval scheme or indexing structure and which
is, in practice, accessed by use of, or reference to, such retrieval scheme or indexing
structure for the principal purpose of retrieving the records, or any portion thereof, on
the basis of the identity of, or so as to identify, an individual or individuals.
Id. § 202(a)(7).
274. Id. § 202(o).
275. Id. § 202(p).
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flicts with the FOIA, the Act establishes that the FOIA will control,
but only to the extent that it expands the subject's access to his
own record."' No exemption of the FOIA may be used to make in-
accessible something which this proposed section makes
accessible .77
3. Title III. Protection of Personal Records Act
The Protection of Personal Records Act"'8 delineates the proce-
dures to be used for disclosure of personal records by a third party
recordkeeper to a federal officer, employee, or agent. 7' Such infor-
mation must be obtained within the guidelines of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act"' unless the recordkeeper suspects a violation of
criminal law by the subject individual.28' Disclosure is permitted
only if: 8' 1) the subject individual authorizes the disclosure of spe-
cific information in a dated and signed writing;2 2) an accurate
accounting has been kept by the third party of all disclosures;28 3)
the individual is given the option to revoke disclosure authorization
at any time and obtain a record of disclosures theretofore made;8 5
and 4) the third party does not require disclosure as a precondition
of doing business with the individual. 86 The information may also
be "disclosed to a federal agent under the authorization of either an
administrative 87 or judicial2 8 subpoena, in which case there must
be reasonable cause to believe that the person about whom the re-
276. Id. § 202(q).
277. Id. § 202(q)(2). For a discussion of the interaction between the FOIA and the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 see Note, An Introduction to the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and Its Effect
on the Freedom of Information Act, 11 NEw ENGL. L. REv. 463 (1976).
278. Id. 99 301-317.
279. Upon inquiry by a federal employee, private companies will disclose personal
records kept in their files, regardless of the information's relevance to the agency's function.
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(A) & (C) (1976). For a discussion of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, see Geltzer, Current Practice Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 65 ILL. B. J. 702
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Geltzer].
281. HR. 2465, supra note 18, § 302(b)(2).
282. The Protection of Personal Records Act disclosure provisions reflect suggestions
made in LINOWEs SuRvEY, supra note 14, at 9.
283. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 303(b).
284. Id. § 303(c).
285. Id. § 303(d).
286. Id. § 303(e).
287. Id. § 304(a).
288. Id. § 306(a).
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cord is kept has violated a federal law. The evidence obtained may
be used to prove only this suspecte4 violation and not a collateral
crime which might emerge.28 Prior to subpoena disclosure, the sub-
ject individual must be served with both a copy of the subpoena
and a notice which allows the subject to object to the anticipated
disclosure within nineteen days of the receipt of these papers. 9" Si-
lence on the part of the individual amounts to acquiescence."' Both
the subject of the record and the recordkeeper have standing to
challenge the subpoena's enforcement. " Either a search warrant
issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure2 3 or a
grand jury subpoena to be used for the sole purpose of returning an
indictment 24 may command disclosure. Information obtained that
is identifiable with a particular person may be used solely for the
purpose for which it is disclosed. 95 The statute of limitations for
enforcing any provision of this Act is three years from the date of
the violation or from its discovery, whichever is later.
In a suit against either the recordkeeper or the federal agent for
violation of this Act, the subject may recover: 1) actual damages;
2) general damages of not less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000;
3) punitive damages for a willful disclosure; 4) attorney fees and
litigation costs; and 5) any appropriate injunctive relief.27 In addi-
tion, a federal employee who knowingly obtains and willfully dis-
closes information in violation of this Act is subject to a fine not to
exceed $5,000, or imprisonment for a term of two years, or both. 8
No records of an intimate nature299 may be obtained, even by a
subpoena or search warrant, 00 absent a compelling state interest.
289. Id. §§ 304(a), 306(a).
290. Id.
291. Id. § 304(a)(3)(B). The Act provides: "If neither you nor the organization named in
the attached subpena [sic] objects to the requested information being made available to us,
the information will be made available to us on and after the nineteenth day after the date
on which this notice is mailed or delivered to you." Id.
292. Id. §§ 304(a)(4), 306(a)(4).
293. Id. § 305.
294. Id. § 308.
295. Id. § 308(2).
296. Id. § 314.
297. Id. § 315.
298. Id. § 316.
299. The Bill includes "business records of a sole proprietor or practitioner" within the
meaning of "intimate records," id. § 307(a), indicating that the definition may be broadly
construed.
300. Id. § 307.
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Pursuant to the fifth amendment, °0 no individual may be com-
pelled to testify as to these records in a criminal proceeding against
him 302
4. Title IV: Privacy of Public Assistance and Social Services
Records Act of 1979
The Privacy of Public Assistance and Social Services Records
Act of 1979 33 establishes that as a condition precedent to the re-
ceipt of federal moneys under a federal public assistance and social
services program, each state must provide measures to maintain
the privacy of the records used to administer the programs in-
volved. 304 A state statute which meets the requirements of this Act,
and is not inconsistent with federal law, will be the sole authority
for state agency disclosures. 05 Before any state's privacy statute
will be given effect, it must be certified by the Department of
Health and Welfare as consistent with the privacy principles set
forth in this Act.30 The requirements for the statute to merit certi-
fication include: 1) notice to the subject iridividual of the kinds of
information it may collect and has collected about him, the pur-
poses for which such information is used, terms of its disclosure,
the subject's right to inspect and the extent to which eligibility for
the program depends on his authorization to disclose; 307 2) proce-
dures for verification of data obtained from collateral sources,
which includes contacting those sources in such a manner so as not
to reveal the specific benefits sought by the subject.3 8 The subject
individual may be denied access to: 1) the identity of a source that
has requested confidentiality; 300 2) records which contain informa-
tion about other clients as well;310 and 3) records used in the course
301. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414 (1966). But cf. Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1958).
302. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 307(b).
303. Id. §§ 401-404.
304. Id. § 402(a)(1)-(2). Some of the programs covered by this Act include those relating
to: aid to families with dependant children; child support; medicaid; social services; the
Food Stamp Act. Id. § 402(a)(2)(A)-(E).
305. Id. § 403(8)(E).
306. Id. § 403.
307. Id. § 403(2).
308. Id. § 403(3).
309. Id. § 403(4)(D).
310. Id. § 403(4)(E).
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of an investigation of a suspected violation of law by the client.3 "
The agency must establish procedures that will maintain the ac-
curacy of the records."' Where a change in the records is made ac-
cording to the client's request, the change is to be reflected wher-
ever information about the subject individual has been
dispensed.3 1 3 No information unrelated to the assistance program
may be requested or maintained.
31'
5. Title V. Privacy of Medical Records Act
As the case law presently indicates, only a showing of a valid
state interest will permit the collection and storage of highly sensi-
tive medical data.315 However, it has been repeatedly asserted by
courts that confidentiality of such records must be preserved by
legislative action rather than by case by case rulings of the
courts. 38 Title V answers this requirement for guidelines on medi-
cal confidentiality issues. The Privacy of Medical Records Act 317 re-
quires that subject individuals be given both access to and copies of
their medical records, as well as an opportunity to correct errone-
ous entries.3"' Medical records may be disclosed only under the fol-
311. Id. § 403(4)(F).
312. Id. § 403(7).
313. Id. § 403(6)(A)(ii).
314. Id. § 403(8).
315. See State v. Jacobus, 75 Misc. 2d 840, 348 N.Y.S. 2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See gener-
ally Kaiser, Patients' Rights of Access to their Own Medical Records: The Need for New
Law, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 317 (1975).
316. See, e.g., State v. Jacobus, 75 Misc. 2d 840, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
where the court held that the state could not compel doctors to record the names and ad-
dresses of parents of aborted fetuses so long as confidentiality was not safeguarded suffi-
ciently by legislative enactment. Id. at 846, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14. See generally Clement,
The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential Business Informa-
tion: The Reverse Freedom of Information Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REv. 587 (1977).
317. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, §§ 501-502. According to Alan Severson, legislative direc-
tor in the office of Rep. Goldwater, this section of the bill has already been considered by
Congress and will be debated further in the next session. Interview, supra note 225. The
topic of medical disclosures, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
318. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 502 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976)) sets out the
correction procedures as:
(1) thirty days after the individual's request, the medical facility must
(a) make the correction requested and so inform the individual, or
(b) inform the individual of the reasons for refusal to correct and the right to
review.
(2) any such request for correction must accompany subsequent disclosures to other
parties.
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lowing conditions:3"' 1) the person requesting the information must
be properly identified; 32 2) the records may be disclosed only to the
extent needed;3 2' 3) no disclosure, with the exception of specified
conditions, 32 may be made without the individual's authoriza-
tion.323 Compliance with this Act is a condition precedent to thefacility's participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.32 4
6. Title VI: Fair Credit Reporting Act Privacy Amendments32 1
The purpose of these amendments is to require that consumer
reporting agencies326 maintain reasonable procedures to prevent dis-
(3) at the individual's request, prior recipients must be notified of the protestations.
Id.
319. Id. In Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 44 A.D. 2d 482, 355
N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974), a case addressing a similar issue, the court held that, since confidenti-
ality of the plaintiff's abortion record was adequately insured by a requirement that these
records not be subject to subpoena or to inspection by anyone other than authorized person-
nel of the New York City Health Department, filing of a certificate with the Health Depart-
ment would not be invalidated. The records were to be disclosed only to the Department's
authorized personnel and only to the extent that they be used (1) for followups in case of
complications; (2) investigation of the propriety of procedures at the facility; and (3) to offer
health counseling on family planning, venereal disease, and Rh factor treatment. Id. at 485-
86, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 784-85.
320. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 502 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976)).
321. Id. § 502 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976)).
322. The specified conditions include:
(1) disclosure to an employee of the facility in the course of his duties;
(2) disclosure to a health professional consulted by the facility;
(3) disclosure due to compelling circumstances of health or safety;
(4) disclosure for use in a health services project;
(5) disclosure for specified Governmental audits and evaluations;
(6) disclosure to a public health authority pursuant to statute;
(7) disclosure of specified information to a law enforcement authority;
(8) disclosure which reveals only the presence of the individual at the facility for
admission purposes;




325. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Extensive discussion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is
beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be noted here that Rep. Cavanaugh introduced
a bill before the House of Representatives on October 12, 1979, the first title of which is an
amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act. H.R. 559, supra note 19. For a more detailed
analysis of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see Geltzer, supra note 280.
326. The term "consumer reporting agency" means any person which, for monetary
fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in
the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other infor-
mation on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties,
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closure of consumer information to unauthorized" 7 persons and to
prevent disclosure of inaccurate, highly damaging information.
Consumers who are adversely affected by a credit decision must be
given specific information328 and must be allowed the opportunity
to dispute the accuracy of any item contained in their dossiers.2
This Act also sets standards to be followed by depository institu-
tions330  and insurance companies 3   when disclosing information
possessed by them. 332 The Federal Trade Commission is granted
authority to issue regulations governing the disclosure of informa-
tion by these institutions and to enforce this title.33
7. Title VII: Confidentiality of Tax Records Act 34
This Act amends the Internal Revenue Code. It restricts disclo-
and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of pre-
paring or furnishing consumer reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f)(1976).
327. Authorized use can be defined as "whether the use of the mercantile agency is a
reasonably necessary method of obtaining indispensable information." Smith, Conditional
Privilege for Mercantile Agencies - Macintosh v. Dun, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 187, 210 (1914).
328. The consumer must be told of the specific reason leading to the adverse decision,
the specific items of information which support the reason, and the consumer's right to in-
spect and copy the information used by the creditor. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, §
602(j)(1)(a)(1)-(3).
329. Id.
330. Id. § 657(1).
331. Id. § 688(3).
332. Id. § 652-653, 655, 671-672, 676. Depository institutions must disclose to the con-
sumer the types of information which may be collected and all types of institutions which
may collect such information. No information which is not described in the disclosure to the
consumer may be collected. Should an adverse decision be made, the consumer must be told
of the specific reason for the decision, the items of information which led to such a decision,
and the consumer's right to inspect all information used to arrive at the decision. If any
information furnished by the institution to the consumer agency is found to be inaccurate,
the institution must inform the consumer agency about the inaccuracy. Id. § 652, 653, 655.
Insurance companies must give the customer access to all information contained in his file
unless the information has been compiled in the process of settling a claim. The individual
may correct discrepancies which must be communicated to other recipients by the company.
If there is a refusal by the insurance company to correct, the individual must be afforded the
opportunity to insert his protest in his file, which will be attached to any future promulga-
tion of the record and will be forwarded to any institution which has, in the two years prior
to this protest, received such information. No insurance institution may make an adverse
underwriting decision based solely on a previous adverse underwriting decision. Id. §§ 671,
672, 676.
333. Id. § 687.
334. Id. §§ 701-706. For a discussion of the misuse of tax data by the IRS, see generally
WAR ON PRIVACY 220-23 (L. Sobel ed. 1976).
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sure by the Internal Revenue Service and state tax officials of infor-
mation contained on taxpayer returns to matters pertaining to: 1)
prospective jurors;"' 2) state tax enforcement; 336 3) investigations of
prospective federal appointees; 37 4) enforcement of child support
obligations;33 and 5) enforcement of a specifically designated fed-
eral statute, i.e., not related to tax administration. 36 The head of
the interested federal agency is required to bring suit against the
taxpayer to compel disclosure of the aforementioned information.340,
The district court may grant such a request only after the agency
has met the burden of proving the following four requirements: 4' 1)
there is probable cause to believe that a specific federal statute has
been violated; 342 2) such return information is probative evidence in
determining the alleged violation; 33 3) there is no rule of law
preventing the particular disclosure; 3" and 4) after reasonable dili-
gence, no other source was found that could yield the information
335. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 702 (repealing I.R.C. § 6103(h)(5)).
336. Id. § 703.
337. Id. § 704. Before disclosure of the appointee's return information, the individual
must be notified in writing of the request for such disclosure and must express his assent in
writing. Id.
338. Id. § 705(6)(B) (amending I.R.C. § 6103(l)(6)). "The Secretary shall disclose return
information . . . only for purposes of, and to the extent necessary in, locating individuals
owing child support obligations." Id.
339. Id. § 706(b)(1)(A) (amending I.R.C. § 6103(i)).
Pursuant to a determination in a civil action . . . .a return or return information shall
be open, but only to the extent necessary as provided in such determination, to of-
ficers and employees of a Federal agency personally and directly engaged in, and
solely for their use in preparation for, any administrative or judicial proceeding (or
any investigation which may result in such a proceeding) pertaining to the enforcement
of a specifically designated Federal statute (not involving tax aministration [sic])
to which the United States or such agency is or may be a party.
Id.
340. Id. § 706(b)(1)(B). Senator Lowell Weicker has said: "If an agency needs to know
something that is contained in a tax return, why not ask the taxpayer directly. Because the
tax return makes bureaucratic investigation easier is not sufficient reason to skirt standard
judicial remedies .... " N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1974, at 4, col. 5.
341. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 706(b)(1)(B).
342. Id. § 706(b)(1)(B)(i).
343. Id. § 706(b)(1)(B)(ii). See Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1975), where the court, siting en banc, affirmed the gambling
conviction of the defendant. The prosecution's case-in-chief was based on tax returns which
reported the defendant's source of income as wagering and gambling. For a discussion of the
self-incrimination problem involved, see Note, The Use of Tax Returns in Non-Tax Prosecu-
tions, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 580 (1975).
344. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 706(b)(1)(B)(iii).
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sought.3 5 Disclosure is barred until all channels of appellate review
are exhausted. 311 The agency may be held responsible for attorney
fees and all costs of litigation if the taxpayer prevails." 7
8. Title VIII: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Amend-
ments of 1979m'
This section amends the General Education Provisions Act .
3  It
requires educational institutions to formulate and adopt a written
policy providing protections for the privacy of personal informa-
tion.s Such policy must provide: 1) access to student records by
the students and their parents;35' 2) restriction on access to these
records by third parties; 32 3) the right to challenge extant infor-
mation and insert clarifying materials;13 4) a description of the
types of information that may be released without the subject's con-
sent 34 and .those that do require such consent;35 5) a defini-
tion of the role of the students and parents in formulating the in-
stitutions' privacy *policies;36 and 6) enforcement of such policies
by the institutions themselves as well as the district courts.357
Federal funds may be withheld from the educational institution to
enforce compliance with the guidelines set forth in this Act.15
The subject individual may bring an action either to compel the
345. Id. § 706(b)(1)(B)(iv).
346. Id. § 706(b)(1)(G).
347. Id. § 706(b)(1)(D).
348. Id. § 801-802. Educational Privacy Rights is a very broad topic and will only be
touched on in this Comment to the extent that it coincides with the federal privacy con-
cerns. For a discussion of such issues, see Snyder, Confidentiality and Student Records, in
THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE: PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES 95-113 (1976).
349. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, (amending 20 U.S.C. 1232g (1976)).
350. Id. § 802.
351. Id. § 802(1).
352. Id. § 802(2)(b)(1).
353. Id. § 802(6).
354. Id. § 802(11).
355. Id. § 802(12).
356. Id. This is one of the requests the plaintiffs made in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1972). See notes 207-08 supra, and accompanying text.
357. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 802(23).
358. Id. § 802(22). Funds are to be withheld if:
(1) the policy adopted by the institution does not conform to this Act; or (2) there has
been a systematic failure on the part of the institution to enforce such a policy; and
(3) sufficient steps to correct this failure have not been taken by the institution after
it has received notice of the infraction.
The sum withheld is to be proportionate to the nature of the violation. Id.
[Vol. VIII
PRIVACY
institution to grant him the right of inspection or to enjoin release of
a record.151 The institution may be compelled to pay costs of lit-
igation.110
D. Review
Various solutions similar to sections of the Bill were suggested
prior to the introduction of the Omnibus Bill. One writer36' sug-
gested self-regulation of the data systems by the computer industry
within certain specified guidelines,6 ' one of which includes an or-
ganization composed of representatives of the computer industry
whose duty it would be to promulgate and enforce the desired stan-
dards.3 16 This organization would have the power to conduct peri-
odic inspections, conciliate disputes between customers, companies
and citizens, license or certify the system in issue contingent on
adequate privacy safeguards, promulgate and enforce a code of
conduct for programmers and key personnel and impose sanctions
on violators.36 ' Another writer3 6 suggested five alternative ap-
proaches, the most important of which is the establishment of a
new federal agency which would fashion regulations providing
for:366 a) notice to subject individuals, b) a review board which
would meet new situations as they arise, c) authorization of inspec-
tors, d) the power to license and certify agencies on the basis of
their adherence to established rules, e) bonding and insuring of
personnel, and f) self-regulation.3 7
The Omnibus Right of Privacy Act seeks to balance the interests
of the individual against society in three ways. First, the Bill re-
stricts the collection of information to only that which is relevant
to the agency's purposes.6 This restriction is accomplished by re-
quiring, within the appropriate titles, that the individual be told
359. Id. § 802(23).
360. Id. For an example of the type of situation which this Act seeks to pre-empt, see
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1972). See note 206 supra and accompanying text.
361. Grenier, Computers and Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation, 1970 DUKE L.J.
495. Although the suggestions contained in this article relate to infringement by private
companies, they are a useful example of the general trend and view of regulation.
362. Id. at 505-13.
363. Id. at 507.
364. Id. at 507-08.
365. Comment, The Computer Data Bank-Privacy Controversy Revisited: An Analysis
and Administrative Proposal, 22 CATH. U. L. REv. 628 (1973).
366. Id. at 643-45.
367. Id. at 648-49.
368. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 202(k)(3)(A).
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what effect his withholding of information will have on the decision
to be made in his behalf"' and that the individual be allowed to
control, in part, the extent to which identifiable information con-
cerning him will be revealed to other agencies. 70 Second, the Bill
requires that subject individuals be informed of the pertinent infor-
mation maintained by federal agencies.37' This is effected by: re-
quiring both authorization for maintenance of data banks37 and
the disclosure to the individual of the intended uses of pertinent
information; 37 3 affording the subject the opportunity to review his
own files and to make protestations and corrections; 374 and giving
the individual adequate legal and equitable remedies as compensa-
tion for a violation of his rights."' Finally, the Bill delineates the
obligations of the agency attendant to the use and disclosure of pri-
vate data 7.3 The Omnibus Bill, if passed, will effectively give the
agencies adequate notice of their duties and liabilities in relation to
the protection of individual privacy rights of the subjects of their
data banks.
VI. Conclusion
Infringement on individual privacy, as indicated by the Subcom-
mittee's findings, 377 has become quite extensive and should not be
accepted as a necessary and inevitable outgrowth of technological
advancement. The protection of important, constitutionally pro-
tected rights demands that many of the proposals now before Con-
gress be enacted as a comprehensive scheme. Such legislation will
insure effective control over data collection in an area now secured
by ad hoc, and often conflicting or unobserved, agency practices.
The deficiencies in the present statutory scheme have been clearly
demonstrated by the Privacy Protection Study Commission in its
assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the FOIA. 38 Congress
has rejected the proposal of one central repository for all of the sta-
369. Id. § 403(2).
370. Id. § 303(b).
371. H.R. 2465, supra note 18, § 2(b)(2).
372. Id. § 202(h)(1)(A)-(I), (o).
373. Id. § 403(2).
374. Id. § 403(6)(A)(ii).
375. Id. § 202(k).
376. Id. § 2(b)(3).
377. See pt. III supra.
378. See pt. IV supra.
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tistical information collected by the federal government because of
the unresolved security problems inherent in such a system. The
proposed Omnibus Bill properly balances an individual's privacy
interests against society's interest in a free flow of information. By
allowing the aggrieved individual a definite remedy in the case of
infringement and injury,379 the bills provide a necessary means for
vindication of the individual's right of privacy. Collection and dis-
semination of only relevant material, and only with the consent of
the subject individual who is aware of the contents of his file,
serves as a further check on privacy encroachments."' These prac-
tices would also provide for accuracy of much information that
now may be unreliable. Vesting a central body with the responsi-
bility of monitoring federal agencies' information practices will in-
crease the effectiveness of the individual's remedies.3 8 1
The outcome of the Congressional debates on the pending pri-
vacy legislation remains to be seen.312 It is true that the objectives
and principles involved are difficult to reconcile. The resulting
choices are often contradictory and the scientific aspects of data
collection are new and continually changing. But the right involved
is not new or foreign. It is an historically recognized right to have
some control over one's "inviolate personality." 3 3 A comprehensive
national information policy is essential if this critical right of pri-
vacy is to survive in the age of technology.
Ludmila Kaniuga-Golad
379. Each Act provides for civil and criminal penalties for the subject of the information
against the dissemination agency. See, e.g., note 297 supra.
380. The Privacy of Research Records Act, for example, allows publication of intimate
information only after consent is freely given, with the exception of a medical emergency or
a judicial order. See notes 183-90 supra and accompanying text.
381. This is the intent of the proposed Federal Information and Privacy Board Act. See
pt. V(B) supra.
382. Id.
383. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205.
1979-801

